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PURE THRESHOLD STRATEGIES FOR A TWO-NODE TANDEM
NETWORK UNDER PARTIAL INFORMATION
BERNARDO D’AURIA AND SPYRIDOULA KANTA
Abstract. In a two node tandem network, customers decide to join or balk by maximizing a
given profit function whose costs are proportional to the sojourn time they spend at each queue.
Assuming that their choices are taken without knowing the complete state of the system, we
show that a pure threshold equilibrium policy exists. In particular we analyze the case when the
partial information consists in informing the arrival customers of the total number of users in
the network.
1. Introduction
Queueing literature is recently devoting an increasing attention to the economic analysis of
queueing systems. Indeed in real applications it is not uncommon that the input to a queueing
system is not exogenously defined and is the result of the combined effect of the decisions made
by the arriving customers. They may decide whether to join or balk the system according to
their convenience and these choices in general lead to a final equilibrium. This phenomenon
is mathematically modeled by assuming they are rationally optimizing a given individual profit
function. This research, started in the ’70s by Naor (1969) and Edelson and Hildebrand (1975), now
has reached a good maturity, two central monographs are Hassin and Haviv (2003) and Stidham
(2009). Most of the literature focuses on a single server system, while we focus here on network
models, in particular a series of twoM/M/· queues. Previous studies have looked at parallel queues
Whitt (1986), Hassin (1996) and Haviv and Zlotnikov (2011) and for more general topologies
extensive studies have been done in the field of telecommunications, see Courcoubetis and Weber
(2003); Roughgarden (2005). A close model is Burnetas (2013), where a series of queues ofM/M/m
types is analyzed and the form of the symmetric customer equilibrium is derived together with the
explicit socially optimal strategies. The main difference with our model is that there customers
make their decisions without getting any information on the state of system, while here they know
the total number of customers already inside. Usually network models show an intrinsic difficulty
in getting explicit results, and this partially explains a relatively scarcer literature. The two node
tandem network that we study has the advantage of being simpler and allowing a complete analysis.
Customers make the decisions to balk or join after knowing how many customers are already in the
network. In real applications, it is common that people do not know the complete information on
the state of the system, as usually this information is shortly summarized to simplify the decision
process. Examples may be found in healthcare systems, where treatment requires two different
steps, such as a first queue to get a doctor reservation and a second queue to be attended by
the doctor. The interesting result is that the partial information setting simplifies drastically the
analysis, allowing to get for this specific case explicit results.
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The model is introduced in Section 2, we compute in Section 3 the expected sojourn time of
an arriving customer assuming that the full state of the system is known. In Section 4 the same
analysis is done when the arriving customers are informed about the total number of customers in
the network. Finally we compute the equilibrium strategy in Section 5.
2. The model
We consider a tandem network with two single server nodes with infinite buffers and service
times independent and exponentially distributed. Using the index l, with l = 1 or 2, to refer to
the first or the second node, we denote by µl the service rate at node l. Customers arrive to the
system according to a Poisson process with rate λ and before joining the network they receive
partial information about the state of the system. The state space is N2, that is all possible pairs
(Q1, Q2) with Ql the queue length at node l. A tagged customer that just arrives, gets a reword R
for joining the network, and pays for each unit of sojourn time at node l a cost Cl with a resulting
random profit given by P = R − C1 S1 − C2 S2 , where Sl denotes the sojourn times she would
spend at node l.
The tagged user makes her decision by optimizing the expected profit given the information she
receives at her arrival time, k = Q1 +Q2, that is
(1) PK(k) = R− C1 TK,1(k)− C2 TK,2(k) ,
with TK,l = EK [Sl|Q1 +Q2 = k]. The subindex K tells that the rest of the population is using a
pure threshold strategy with threshold K in joining the queue. That is all users besides the tagged
one join the network if and only if it contains less than K customers.
The main result of the paper is to show that the tandem network admits a pure threshold K,
that is there exists a K ∈ N such that
PK(k) ≥ 0 as k < K and PK(k) < 0 as k ≥ K .
Remark 1. By using the subindex K, we are implicitly assuming that the rest of population is not
allowed to use strategies different from a pure threshold one. This assumption is not restrictive for
our purposes, but it does not preclude the existence of policies (even of equilibrium type) that are
of a different form.
Remark 2. We always assume that R > C1/µ1 + C2/µ2. Being this relation false, a user would
get negative net profit even joining an empty network implying a unique equilibrium given by the
empty system.
Before analyzing the described model, we first study the case when the complete information is
available to the arriving customers. This is done in the next section.
3. Mean sojourn times
Let Sl(n,m) be the sojourn time spent at queue l by a tagged customer that joins a sys-
tem being in state (n − 1,m), that is she is going to occupy position n in the first queue. Let
Tl(n,m) = E[Sl(n,m)] be the corresponding expectation and T (n,m) = T1(n,m) + T2(n,m) the
total expected sojourn time. The sojourn time in the first queue is Erlang distributed, that is
S1(n,m) ∼ Erlang(n, µ1) with mean T1(n,m) = n/µ1 . The total sojourn time can be computed
recursively by applying a first step analysis, that leads to the following formula,
(2) T (n,m) =
1
µ1 + µ2
+
µ1
µ1 + µ2
T (n− 1,m+ 1) +
µ2
µ1 + µ2
T (n,m− 1), n, m > 0.
The second term in the right hand side of (2) considers a potential departure from the first queue
and the last term a potential departure from the second queue. These events occur with probability
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µl/(µ1 + µ2), l = 1, 2 respectively. To complete the recursion the following boundary conditions
are needed
(3) T (0,m) =
m
µ2
; T (n+ 1, 0) =
1
µ1
+ T (n, 1), n, m > 0.
Using (2) we get a recursive formula to compute T2(n,m) as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The expected sojourn time at the second queue, T2(n,m), can be computed with the
following recursive formula
(4) T2(n,m) =
(
µ2
µ1 + µ2
)m
T2(n− 1, 1) +
µ1
µ1 + µ2
m−1∑
k=0
(
µ2
µ1 + µ2
)k
T2(n− 1,m+ 1− k)
valid for n > 0 and T2(0,m) = m/µ2, with m ≥ 0.
Proof. By (2), we get that T2(n,m) satisfies the following recursive equation
T2(n,m) =
µ1
µ1 + µ2
T2(n− 1,m+ 1) +
µ2
µ1 + µ2
T2(n,m− 1), n, m > 0,
and by (3), similar boundary conditions are satisfied. By induction argument it is then straight-
forward to verify that (4) holds true. 
The following lemma characterizes the conditions under which the T -functions are monotone
non-decreasing in the variable n. These conditions are important for the analysis of Section 5.
Lemma 4. The functions T1(n,m) and T (n, k−n) are non decreasing in n. The function T2(n,m)
is non decreasing in n if and only if µ1 ≥ µ2.
Proof. The statement is obvious for T1(n,m) that does not depend on m.
One way to show that the function T (n, k − n) is non decreasing in n, for n ≤ k is by proving
that T (n+ 1,m) ≥ T (n,m+ 1) by induction using equations (2)–(3). We prefer to use a coupling
argument. Using the same probability space, we construct two networks starting respectively with
(n + 1,m) and (n,m + 1) initial users. The proof follows by comparing the waiting times of the
customers that are the last ones in the first queue of both networks, and showing that the one in
the former network waits more than the corresponding one in the latter. To construct the coupling
we assume that the service times for all customers are the same in both networks but we move the
customer in service at the first queue of the first network at the end of the queue of the second
node of the second network. Since the exit times are ordered by the FIFO discipline and because
the moved customer reduces its sojourn time by her service time in the first node, the result holds.
Finally to show that T2(n,m) is non decreasing in n we prove that ∆1T2(0,m) ≥ 0 for all m
where ∆1T2(n,m) = T2(n + 1,m) − T2(n,m). From (4), the following holds for any n > 0 and
m ≥ 0,
(5) ∆1T2(n,m) =
(
µ2
µ1 + µ2
)m
∆1T2(n−1, 1)+
µ1
µ1 + µ2
m−1∑
k=0
(
µ2
µ1 + µ2
)k
∆1T2(n−1,m+1−k) .
If ∆1T2(0,m) ≥ 0 the same holds for n > 0 as all the coefficients in (5) are positive. In the opposite
case T2(n,m) is clearly decreasing for some value of (n,m). Let α = µ1/µ2, one can check that
∆1T2(0,m) =
1
µ2
(
α− 1 + (α+ 1)−m
α
)
.
The quantity above is decreasing in m. To check that it would be non negative for any value of m
we take m→∞ and get the required condition α ≥ 1. 
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4. Expected sojourn times under the K-strategy
We assume that all arriving customers receive the partial information about the state of the
network and decide to join only if the number of customers in the system, say k, is less then a
given threshold K ≥ 0. Under the K–strategy the tandem network behaves as a semiopen Jackson
network, see (Chen and Yao, 2001, Section 2.3). Let Q∗l be the stationary random number of
customers at node l and Q∗ = Q∗1 +Q
∗
2 be the stationary total number of customers in the queue.
The stationary distribution is given by, see (Chen and Yao, 2001, Theorem 2.5),
(6) piK(n,m) = PK(Q
∗
1 = n,Q
∗
2 = m) = cK ρ
n
1ρ
m
2 , n+m ≤ K
where ρl = λ/µl and c
−1
K =
∑
n+m≤K ρ
n
1 ρ
m
2 is the normalization constant.
Assuming n ≤ K, the conditional probability PK(Q
∗
l = n|Q
∗ = k) = ρnl ρ
k−n
3−l /
∑k
h=0 ρ
h
l ρ
k−h
3−l
does not depend on K. Let pl(n|k) = PK(Q
∗
l = n|Q
∗ = k), after algebraic manipulation, we get
(7) pl(n|k) =


µk−nl µ
n
3−l(µ1 − µ2)/(µ
k+1
1 − µ
k+1
2 ) µ1 6= µ2
1/(1 + k) µ1 = µ2
.
The independence from K allows to consider the random variables Q∗l (k), l ∈ {1, 2}, having
distributions pl(·|k) and not depending on the pure threshold strategy employed by all customers.
Remark 5. The assumption that the rest of population follows a threshold policy is necessary in
order to have the steady state distribution expressed in the form given in (7).
Let us define by Tl(k) = E[Sl|Q
∗ = k] the expected sojourn time at queue l of a tagged customer
that enters a system containing k customers.
Lemma 6. Assuming µ1 6= µ2, it holds that
T1(k) =
1
µ1 − µ2
−
k + 1
µ1
µk+12
µk+11 − µ
k+1
2
(8)
T2(k) =
(
1−
µ2
µ1
)
µk+11
µk+11 − µ
k+1
2
k∑
n=0
T2(n+ 1, k − n)
(
µ2
µ1
)n
(9)
and for µ1 = µ2, T1(k) = 1/µ1(1 + k/2) and T2(k) = 1/(k + 1)
∑k
n=0 T2(n+ 1, k − n).
Proof. By definition T1(k) = 1/µ1
∑k
n=0(n+ 1) p1(n|k), therefore (7) with µ1 6= µ2 implies
T1(k) =
1
µ1
µ1 − µ2
µk+11 − µ
k+1
2
k∑
n=0
(n+ 1)µk−n1 µ
n
2
=
1
µ1
µk1(µ1 − µ2)
µk+11 − µ
k+1
2
µ2+k1 − (2 + k)µ1µ
1+k
2 + (k + 1)µ
2+k
2
µk1(µ1 − µ2)
2
.
Simplifying the expression above we get (8). The formula for T2(k) is obtained similarly by the
expression T2(k) =
∑k
n=0 T2(n + 1, k − n) p1(n|k). The results for µ1 = µ2 can be obtained in a
similar way or more directly by noticing that in this case the random variables Q∗l are discrete
uniformly distributed on {0, 1, . . . , k}. One could also compute the limit of the expressions (8) and
(9) as µ1 → µ2. 
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5. Threshold equilibrium stategy
By Lemma 6 the expected profit of a tagged customer receiving the information k, given in (1),
does not depend on the strategy K employed by the rest of customers. We can therefore compute
it as
(10) P (k) = R− C1 T1(k)− C2 T2(k) .
The tagged customer decides to enter only if P (k) ≥ 0. In the sequel we show under what conditions
the expected net profit function is decreasing in k, moreover since this function is constant with
respect to the strategy K, we obtain that the equilibrium strategy is in addition a dominant
strategy in the class of threshold strategies. Before stating the main result we require the following
Lemma on the stochastic monotonicity of the random variables Q∗l (k).
Lemma 7. The random variables Q∗l (k) are increasing stochastically ordered in k ≥ 0.
Proof. In order to show that Q∗l (k+1) ≥st Q
∗
l (k) it is enough to prove the stronger condition given
by the likelihood ratio ordering, see Chen and Yao (2001). This last condition can be checked by
proving that
(11) P{Q∗l (k + 1) = n+ 1}P{Q
∗
l (k) = n} ≥ P{Q
∗
l (k + 1) = n}P{Q
∗
l (k) = n+ 1}
for any n ≥ 0. It easy to check that (11) holds as equality for any n < k and is a strict inequality
for n = k where the second term is 0 and therefore the result holds true. 
Remark 8. We explicitly note that the result of Lemma 7 is different from requiring that the
variables Q∗l are stochastically ordered with respect to the strategy K. This result refers to non
conditional quantities and could be proved by a coupling argument similar to the one used in
Sakuma and Miyazawa (2005).
Lemma 7 implies the following monotonicity result to the mean sojourn functions.
Lemma 9. The functions T1(k) and T (k) are non decreasing for all values of the ratio µ1/µ2.
The function T2(k) is non decreasing when this ratio is greater than 1.
Proof. The function T1(k) is non decreasing by Lemma 7 and because T1(n,m) is non decreasing
in n as well. For T (k), it follows by the following
T (k + 1) = E[T (Q∗1(k + 1), k + 1−Q
∗
1(k + 1))]
≥ E[T (Q∗1(k + 1), k −Q
∗
1(k + 1))] ≥ E[T (Q
∗
1(k), k −Q
∗
1(k))] = T (k)(12)
where in the last equality we used the fact that T (n, k − n) is non decreasing, see Lemma 4, and
the stochastic monotonicity of the variables Q∗1(k), proved in Lemma 7. A similar argument works
for the function T2(k). Assuming µ1 ≥ µ2, we have
T2(k + 1) = E[T2(k + 1−Q
∗
2(k + 1), Q
∗
2(k + 1))]
≥ E[T2(k −Q
∗
2(k + 1), Q
∗
2(k + 1))] ≥ E[T2(k −Q
∗
2(k), Q
∗
2(k))] = T2(k) .(13)
The first inequality follows by Lemma 4 under the assumption on the service rates, the second
inequality follows by the monotonicity of Q∗2(k), shown in Lemma 7, and the fact that T2(k−m,m)
is non decreasing in m for any fixed k > 0. 
Corollary 10. If µ1 > µ2 or if C1 ≥ C2 the expected net profit, P (k), is non increasing .
Proof. The result follows from Lemma 9 if µ1 > µ2. If C1 ≥ C2, it is enough to rewrite the profit
function as P (k) = R−(C1−C2)T1(k)−C2 T (k), and use the monotonicity of T1(k) and T (k). 
Finally we state the main result that gives the conditions to find the strategy that induces the
Nash equilibrium.
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Theorem 11. When the information known by the arriving customers is the total number of
customers in the network only, then the equilibrium strategy is given by the threshold K such that
(14) K = argmin{k ∈ N : P (k) < 0} .
According to this strategy a tagged customer enters only if she finds less than K customers in the
system. The K-strategy is a dominant strategy in the class of threshold strategies.
Proof. Let the index K be the one obtained by formula (14), including K = ∞. We show that
the strategy K is the best response against itself. The system is always ergodic, therefore with no
loss of generality we assume it starts empty. Since all customers employ the K-strategy the tagged
user will never find more then K customers in the system and according to (14), she will follow
the same strategy, and the result follows.
The actions that the tagged customer may take for the values of k > K are irrelevant as she
will never find the system in these states. However if the monotonicity conditions given in Lemma
9 hold, the K-strategy leads to a subgame perfect equilibrium, see Hassin and Haviv (2003).
The K-strategy is dominant because it is the best response to any other possible threshold
strategy. This holds because the net profit function does not depend neither on the arrival rate
nor on the threshold employed by other customers. Assuming that the system is working under a
pure strategy with a threshold different from K, if at some point in time customers start to behave
selfishly, they will all adopt the K-strategy. If the monotonicity conditions of Lemma 9 are not
satisfied, this statement uses the fact that the Markov chain is ergodic and it hits almost surely
the null state. 
The expression (10) depends on the values of the function T2(n,m) given in (9) and as such we
cannot expect to obtain a closed formula for the equilibrium threshold strategy. However we can
always compute it numerically by (9).
6. Conclusions
This works analyzes the equilibrium behavior of a tandem network when customers may choose
the actions of balking or joining the system by taking into account economic considerations. This
paper is the first to look at queues in series, and the surprising result is that if users only receive
partial information on the status of the network, in particular the total number of customers in
the system, a pure strategy exists. It may be the case that such result may be extended to more
general network topologies, this will be the subject of future research.
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